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Abstract: This study presents the results of an investigation into the frequency in which four 
candidates of the 2016 US. Presidential primary season communicated their political positions on 
climate change, and how they subsequently framed these stances in numerous contextual drivers 
alongside energy policies. A systematic content analysis of political debates, campaign speeches, and 
press statements reveals how Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders, Donald Trump, and Ted Cruz 
undertook in vote-seeking behaviour to create distinct stances on energy and climate issues. Results 
indicate not only partisan polarization, but also-that stakeholder dynamics, control of 
communications and communication frequency are inter-dependent and reinforcing in generating 
differing climate positions. Institutional dynamics exacerbate these ‘logic schisms’ rather than 
providing a means of collective decision making. We test such climate discourse according to a 
typology of scientific, economic, national security, and moral frames.  We also assess how particular 
frames morph over time, and are impacted by exogenous factors such as global climate change 
negotiations, national environmental crises (such as the Flint Water Crisis), and contestation over 
stranded assets and fossil fuel divestment.  We find that political climate discourse must 
communicate to collective, bipartisan interests whilst avoiding politically divisive climate frames.  
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The Presidential Politics of Climate Discourse: Energy Frames, Policy, and Political Tactics from the 
2016 Primaries in the United States 
1: Introduction  
The 2016 U.S presidential primaries have been perhaps the most captivating election cycle since 
Barack Obama’s insurgent victory in 2008. Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton faced challenges from 
the left by Independent-turned-Democrat Bernie Sanders whilst Billionaire GOP nominee Donald 
Trump defeated sixteen other contenders, including Ted Cruz (Jacobs et al., 2016). Voter turnout in 
the primary cycle rivalled that of 2008, with Republicans seeing record numbers and Democrats 
experiencing a higher than usual number of participants (DeSilver, 2016).  
The election cycle has been criticised for its lack of coverage on climate change issues (Kalhoefer, 
2016). Concerns for the economy, healthcare, employment, and national security seemed to 
represent the most salient issues to both Democrats and Republicans. Polling data suggests that 
both parties regarded climate change as ‘below average in importance’. Nonetheless, climate 
change is the single most discrepant issue tested, with Democrats’ importance rating 48 percentage 
points higher than Republicans’ (Gallup, 2016).  
The political discourse of climate change has split policymakers between the convinced and sceptical 
camps. It has been argued that such discourse has led the climate debate to a new plateau of 
polarization where meaningful dialogue between participants has been found wanting (Hoffman, 
2011). Such logic schisms (Hoffman, 2011) present significant barriers to climate and energy policy. If 
policymakers are to overcome these logic schisms, it is important to understand how the intentions 
of agency behaviour shape climate change stances and what the consequences for policymaking are. 
Presidential election cycles are thus the opportune time to keep one’s finger not only on the political 
pulse of America, but other places where populism and post-truth politics are on the rise (Janda et 
al. 2017) 
This study presents the results of an investigation into the frequency in which four candidates of the 
2016 US. Presidential primary season communicated their political positions on climate change, and 
how they subsequently framed these stances within numerous contextual drivers. Ted Cruz; Donald 
Trump; Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders were the most successful candidates by vote share in each 
party adding legitimacy to their climate positions. Although the primaries did not receive as much 
political coverage as the general election, the investigation itself still offers insight into how political 
actors may genuinely stand on climate issues as nominees often converge to the centre after 
winning the primaries (Hummel, 2010). Discourse, framing and content analysis reveal how vote-
seeking behaviour shapes the presidential candidates’ climate change stances. The study develops a 
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basic taxonomy developed of four issue categories with two dichotomous frames per category for 
source analysis. This highlights the key differences between the candidates whilst broadly capturing 
both sides of the logic schism. The study examines the results of the investigation and indicates 
towards partisan polarisation. The frequency in which the candidates invoked a climate frame 
reveals differing climate communication strategies. Identifying the most often-communicated 
climate stances also uncovers how the campaigns attempted to win votes by appealing to 
stakeholders in specific frames.  
Lastly, the study contextualises political climate change discourse and identifies three drivers: the 
2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP21), The Flint Water Crisis and Clinton’s 
“Greenpeace Gaffe.” This serves to go beyond the counting of frames to demonstrate discursive 
tactics in action. These ‘frames in motion’ contextually evolve within stakeholder sensitivities and 
shape climate narratives and agency influence accordingly. As such, the study reveals how important 
the political campaigns regard the need to control their climate stances in both unforeseen and 
predicted circumstances and how this may hinder or advance climate policy development. 
Significantly, institutional-stakeholder dynamics, control of communications and communication 
frequency are inter-dependent and reinforcing in generating differing climate positions. Such a 
relationship exacerbates the current logic schism between policymakers. The implications of such a 
study make a case for political climate discourse to develop ‘broker categories’ in which climate 
positions can be collectively communicated between seemingly polarised interests and narratives. 
National security is offered as a means of potential reconciliation and the discourse surrounding this 
must be deliberative in order to promote consensus driven politics and raise public awareness, 
bringing more stakeholders into the discussion.  
2: Political Communication, Discourse, Content Analysis, and Frames  
This section of the paper presents our key conceptual approaches, namely those of political 
communication, discourse, content analysis, and frames. Thus, the framework utilized in this study is 
the result of synthesising several literatures. Political communication and political economy 
literature provide the assumption that all candidates seek power and communicate policy stances to 
gain votes. Content analysis reveals the extent to which candidates regard the issue of climate 
change as a source of political capital, denoted by the frequency in which the issue is raised. 
Discourse analysis and framing literature reveal how the candidates communicate a narrative by 
specifically constructing climate stances to engage specific stakeholders. How candidates employ 
certain frames will ultimately uncover whether candidates frame their stances different in context 
specific situations in order to maximise political capital.  
 
   4 
2.1 Political communication  
We begin by drawing from political communications literature to illuminate the machinations and 
intentions of agency behaviour and source material.  Denton and Woodward state that ‘the crucial 
factor that makes communication ‘political’ is not the source of the message, but its content and 
purpose’ (1990, p.11). ‘Content and purpose’ allude to embedded interests; namely, what the 
sender’s intentions in influencing the political arena are. McNair describes this intentionality of 
political communication as ‘purposeful communication about politics’; arriving to the conclusion that 
communications undertaken by political actors are for the purpose of achieving specific objectives 
(McNair, 2011, p.4). This conception of political communication lies in the standard assumption of 
political economy: that leaders act with the goal of maintaining or achieving power (Victor, 2009). To 
contextualise the abstract, this statement is true for all presidential candidates as they are 
significantly motivated by the possibility of winning elections (Hummel, 2010). Presidential elections 
have especially strong incentives to pursue vote-seeking strategies because candidates must win a 
large portion of the national electorate (Samuels, 2002). An explanation of candidate’s behaviour is 
developed: candidates communicate climate stances in an attempt to convince the electorate that 
they are the best suited contender to serve as President.  
2.2 Discourse and logic schisms  
Despite the apparent settling of the debate within the academic sphere the understanding of 
climate change within the public and political realm remains unresolved (Hoffman, 2011, p.8). 
Discourse analysis is useful in identifying and comprehending a political actor’s understanding of 
anthropogenic induced climate change. We take Adger et al’s. (2001, p.683) definition that discourse 
represents ‘a shared meaning of a phenomenon’. Phenomena vary in magnitude and may be 
understood by small or large groups of stakeholders on levels ranging from the local to the 
international. The actors devoted to a discourse participate in varying degrees to its influence by 
transforming, promoting and reproducing through written and oral statements. Such a constructivist 
approach uses an ‘anti-essentialist ontology [assuming] the existence of multiple, socially 
constructed realities rather than a single reality… and puts emphasis on the communications 
through which knowledge is exchanged’ (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005, p.176). Nietzsche’s statement 
that ‘there are no facts, only interpretations’ (Dean, 2006, p.29) is insightful because actors have 
differing conceptions of reality, rather than objective facts.  These shared meanings are indicative of 
subjective worldviews (Sovacool, Brown and Valentine, 2016, p.332), representing a particular way 
of viewing the world and defining what is possible. Thus, for stakeholders, discourse captures the 
problems and their necessary solutions (Rafey and Sovacool,2011, p.1142). 
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Given the scientific consensus on climate change, we have polarized the discourse into two distinct 
camps – those that hold to the worldview of anthropogenic climate change and all other views. 
Hoffman (2011) proposes that a “logic schism” - whereby competing worldviews hold no common 
values and beliefs - exists concerning the debate on anthropogenic induced climate change. Such 
schisms ‘arise due to linguistic and value differences that lead to positions that are relatively 
exclusive, rigid, inelastic and restricted’ (Hoffman, 2011, p.8-9). The result leading to both sides 
talking past each other. Hajer and Versteeg (2005) argue that a discussion (the object of discursive 
analysis) is subject to democratic quality, known as ‘deliberation’. A phenomenon can have 
‘deliberative quality if it is inclusive, open, accountable, reciprocal and integer and when the various 
participants can learn through iterative dialogue’(Hajer and Versteeg, 2005, p.176). Logic schisms in 
part arise from a lack of deliberation in discourse and if meaningful climate policy is to transcend 
such barriers, discourse and climate politics need to be consensus orientated. Easier said than done. 
Partisan polarization - the homogenisation of policy positions and increasing differences between 
party stances on major political issues, is increasing (Layman, Carsey and Horowitz, 2006). Hoffman 
(2011, p.20) offers ‘broker categories’ - worldviews that hold common ground; in order to bridge the 
schism to difficult issues. At the same time, these categories need to be non-threatening 
(deliberative) in nature so as not to be immediately dismissed out of hand by competing 
stakeholders.   
2.3 Content analysis  
Relatedly, content analysis is useful in understanding how actors use language to mobilise key 
stakeholders, shape public opinion and build consensus on solutions whilst sustaining media 
attention on the specific issue (Fletcher, 2009).  
Content analysis is the systematic classification and description of content according to certain pre-
determined categories. Content analysis can both quantitatively and qualitatively analyse source 
material rendering it a useful tool in tracking media depictions and textual content of an issue 
(Berger, 2016). Quantitative content analysis is primarily concerned with counting and classifying the 
occurrences of the phenomena under investigation, involving frequency counts of key words 
(Treadwell, 2011; Sovacool, 2014). Qualitative content analysis is the subjective interpretation of the 
content of text data through a systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or 
patterns. It attempts to analyse language in order to classify text into an efficient number of 
categories that represent similar meanings (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). 
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2.4 Energy frames and media framing  
Our final conceptual tool is that of a “frame” or “framing.”  Sovacool, Brown and Valentine (2016, 
p.4) state that frames underpin differing conceptions of reality, influencing how knowledge is 
shaped, conditioned and digested. Frames therefore represent the organisation of collective 
interests and normative assumptions - a worldview of an issue (Sovacool and Brown, 2015; Valentine 
et al. 2017). This means the notion of a frame cuts across political communication, discourse, 
potential logic schisms, and content.  The candidates communicate their constructed realities in 
particular frames to mobilise stakeholder interests. Frequently communicating in specific frames 
reveals how the candidates wish to win votes from targeted stakeholders, demonstrating how useful 
the frame is as a source of political capital.  
In identifying an energy frame in this study, the logic follows that the campaign perceives this 
interpretation as an opportunity to stimulate engagement with specific stakeholders. We use the 
analytical perspective of boundary framing to construct a taxonomy of what types of frames the 
candidates communicate. This process is used to define a contextual boundary of what falls “inside” 
and “outside” the communicated frame. Boundary framing therefore involves the assessment of 
how the phenomena is demarcated (Fuller and McCauley, 2016), something explored in the next 
section.  
3. Research Design: Towards a Taxonomy of Climate Change and Energy Frames  
To analyse the issue of climate change within the 2016 primaries, data were collected from 
presidential debates, campaign speeches and press releases and statements. With the 
acknowledgment of vote-seeking behaviour, these sources were where the candidates had the most 
control in how climate stances were presented to stakeholders. It is for this reason that interviews 
were not included as a form of source for analysis. At the mercy of the interviewer, candidates may 
be forced to answer questions regarding under-developed policy stances or issues that they are 
uncomfortable in elaborating. Although interviews may reveal more about the candidates’ stances 
on issues because a direct question requires a response and subsequent dialogue, the aim was to 
see if candidates chose to mention climate change themselves. This fits with the developed 
framework in relation to the frequency in which climate positions are regarded by candidates as a 
source of political revenue.  
Despite the primaries formally opening in February 2016, candidates had been campaigning for over 
half a year prior to this. The study starts with Ted Cruz’s announcement to run for president, on the 
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23rd of March 2015. The period is finalised on 8th June 2016 when Clinton effectively won the 
Democratic nomination after the California primary.  
Debate and speech transcriptions were found from internet sources such as C-SPAN and The 
Washington Post and The American Presidency Project. Press releases were found at the campaign 
websites. Keywords used to find such instances were: “Global Warming”; “Temperature”; “Carbon”; 
“Green House Gases”; “Climate” and “Environment”. Climate stances may be simultaneously 
communicated in multiple frames. In such an occurrence, each frame was counted and coded in 
order to best reveal which forms of communication the candidates regarded were the most 
appropriate to appeal to stakeholders. Frames were also coded multiple times if they were used 
more than once in any given source. A total of 561 sources were initially gathered over the time 
period and the final dataset was narrowed down to 134 sources that included one or more instance 
of climate change. 
The first type of source were primary debates. These represent the formal presentation of 
candidate’s policy stances in a politicized arena. There are similarities to debates and interviews and 
including the debates somewhat contradicts the previous statement of candidates having complete 
control over their communications. But it would be an error to omit the most accessible manner in 
which candidates communicate their climate stances because campaigns need the audiences that 
televised debates afford (Kraus, 2000). The primaries allow candidates the opportunity to tour the 
country giving speeches making it logical to analyse such source material in order to discover the 
frequency that they raise the issue of climate change. Noting the geographical location of 
noteworthy speeches is important as it alludes to the voter demographics which may reward the 
candidate with the most attuned climate policies, contextualising stakeholder sensitivities. Press 
releases are the most accessible form of source as they appear on all of the candidates’ campaign 
websites. Their intentionality is clear as they are designed to advertise the candidate’s campaign. 
Although Denton and Woodward (1990) downplayed the importance of the form of the source, it is 
argued that some sources have larger political implications than others due to the amount of 
coverage a particular source will receive. For example, a serious blunder in a press release will 
receive relatively little attention outside of the most politically engaged circles than would the same 
blunder in a televised debate broadcast to millions of people.  
A taxonomy of climate frames provided the coding schema for the study's analysis. The developed 
coding key is drawn from Hoffman’s (2011) ‘issue categories’ which were used to identify frames 
within sceptical and convinced periodicals. Hoffman (2011, p.10) identifies seven categories: science, 
risk, technology, economics, religion, political ideology and national security. Because framing 
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analysis was used only to serve as a template to structure the content analysis, a simplified version 
of Hoffman’s (2011) work is implemented here.   
A decision was made to omit religion as no candidate directly appealed under this paradigm. The 
instances when political ideology was communicated was under the science frame in an attempt by 
Democrats to contrast their acceptance of climate change with the Republican’s rejection. Although 
technology is intrinsic to climate policies, it is argued that this is a matter of energy policy rather 
than climate policy. Energy policy is explored to implicitly uncover climate stances, illustrated in 
Section 5. Risk and national security were combined in this study. As a result, four categories 
comprising of eight frames (two frames per category) formed the taxonomy for the coding schema. 
Each category can be framed in a way that makes the case for climate change mitigation or non-
action. This polarisation enables the method to capture both sides of the on-going logic schism. A 
limit to this methodical approach should be noted: the possibility of omitting nuances within the 
discourse exists which may be traced back to the somewhat absolutist polarization of the categories. 
Although, as Hoffman (2011, p.5) points out, when no common debate is to be found, one may 
speculate if any nuances within the debate can exist given the current polarization of party 
discourse.   
3.1 Science (Certainty and Uncertainty)  
Scientific certainty underpins the diagnosis of all the candidate’s positions on climate change. The 
logic schism starts here. Whether climate change is regarded as scientifically certain or scientifically 
uncertain shapes the candidates’ divergent views. Whenever a candidate would invoke the science 
of climate change, in an attempt to confirm or refute it, the instance was accordingly coded as a 
science frame. In a similar manner, a simple comment of (dis)belief in climate change was regarded 
as a primer to discover what side of the scientific fence the candidates came down on.  
3.2 Economic Performance (Investment and Cost) 
Candidates economically framed climate change in either terms of investment or cost. Climate 
change could be framed as an opportunity of investment through mitigation policies, encouraging 
growth and saving larger costs in the future by rejecting a high discount rate. By contrast, 
environmental regulations could be regarded as barriers to growth or questioning if mitigation is 
cost-effective. A high discount rate is therefore acceptable in this interpretation.  
3.3 National Security (Interventionists and Isolationists)  
Security is “an accentuated discourse on vulnerability” (Barnet, 2003, p.1), socially constructed 
rather than objective, it is attached to what is regarded as the most vulnerable of entities such as the 
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nation; property; income; and basic needs (Kester et al. 2017). Defining particular risks is a political 
one (Waever, 1995), but Fletcher (2009, p.808) points out that security provides Republicans and 
Democrats the opportunity for cooperation on climate change mitigation legislation. The ultimate 
concern of environmental security discourse is the present and future welfare of humankind with 
the understanding that maintaining the ecological orders that sustain humanity is indispensable 
(Mulligan, 2010; Westing, 1986; Reuveny, 2007). Given the context of the primary elections, 
environmental securitisation is examined under the lens of national security (income and property 
were included in the economic frame) as the candidates would use discursive tactics to persuade 
stakeholders on the priorities involving the nation’s security – alluding to a realist perspective. 
The interventionist regards climate change as a threat to national security and therefore seeks to 
mitigate these aforementioned implications. A sense of existentialism is included here, the risk being 
so great that inaction verges on the suicidal, with the need to ‘combat’ climate change being of great 
importance. The category also involved aspects of international relations, attempting to persuade 
other nation states to act in the interests of U.S. security is considered an international aspect of 
interventionism.  
By contrast, the isolationist would reject these notions: climate change is not seen as a national 
security risk so no mitigating action is required (presumably following a scientifically uncertain 
frame). Climate refugees are not legally recognised (Biermann and Boas, 2010) and subsequent 
immigration policies can address migration issues. Nor should the USA have to involve itself by 
solving developing nations climate related issues at its own expense. Actors may use discursive 
tactics to downplay the risks of climate change whilst simultaneously constructing supposed higher 
risk issues such a terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Rejecting international agreements under 
claims that it undermines national sovereignty are also isolationist principles. 
3.4 Moral Predicament (Obligated and Agonistic)  
Although omitting Hoffman’s (2011) religious category, a moral category was used as an alternative. 
The morally obligated framed climate change mitigation in tones of environmental justice, inter-
generational justice, the inequality of burden sharing and ending fossil fuel exploitation of workers 
and the environment. The morally agnostic, a somewhat IR realist perspective, see no such 
obligation if other countries refuse to lower their emissions. A rejection of the science of climate 
change also liberates them from all moral obligations.  
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4: Results and Discussion: Contextualizing Political Climate Change Discourse    
This section presents and discusses our results. It both analyses the initial findings of the 
investigation with an emphasis on how discourse and frames changed over time, and it also 
investigates particular events that spurred climate communications. This presents the opportunity to 
examine how agency behaviour was influenced by unfolding political events or points of 
controversy. Three key events were identified that generated a prolonged discussion on climate 
change mitigation. The Paris COP21 talks in early December; the Flint Water Crisis in March; and 
Clinton’s Greenpeace gaffe in April. Such an analysis was able to tease out the discursive tactics in 
action, recognising that particular frames and how frequently they are communicated within the 
political landscape shape climate narratives and agency influence.  
The second half of the section shows the influence of institutional dynamics and how attempts to 
control climate communications raises implications for agency and stakeholder behaviour. 
‘Morphogenetic cycles’ (Archer, 1982) describe the relationship that institutional dynamics have 
with stakeholders and political actors. The structural conditioning of actors by rules and institutions 
is influenced by institutions’ (in this case the political parties) responsiveness to stakeholder 
concerns. Actors or stakeholders may seek to influence this conditioning through social interactions 
and discursive strategies, attempting to change an institution’s narrative. This is in turn will shape 
agency behaviour and stakeholder perceptions. Cyclical in nature, these dynamics are ever in 
process and have implication on how climate policies may evolve over time.  
4.1 The temporal dynamics of energy frames and climate discourse  
Almost a quarter of the sample contained instances of climate change. The frequency in which the 
candidates mentioned and framed the issue varies substantially. Some candidates regarded climate 
change as a salient issue and their subsequent position as a vote winner whilst others did not. Table 
1 breaks down this frequency by candidate and source material and Figure 1 illustrates this. Out of 
the 134 sources that contained one or more instance of climate change, Sanders communicated and 
framed climate change by a significant margin when compared to the others. His total number of 
source instances and frequency is more than double his nearest opponent, Clinton. Sanders’ total 
count of climate frames (184) is more than the other candidates combined; accounting for 62.37% of 
all climate instances. Sanders is also the only candidate to mention climate change in all of the 
debates whilst Cruz does not meaningfully communicate about climate change in any.1 Similarly, of 
the campaign speeches analysed for Cruz, no instance of climate change was discovered. The only 
instances of climate change that Cruz communicates are found within press releases. The results  
                                                          
1 Cruz attempts to discuss climate change in 4th Republican debate but cut off by moderator and other 
candidates: “….when it comes to climate change…..”, not counted as frame not revealed.  
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seem to fall under party lines, both Democratic candidates top the list whilst the Republicans pay lip 
service to the issue and form the bottom half. Such results contribute to the importance of party 
politics influencing climate change saliency (Farstad, 2016).  
 
Table 1. Frequency that Presidential Candidates Mentioned Climate Change by Type of Source 
  
 
Source: Authors 
 
Candidate Debates 
 
 
Campaign 
Speeches/Remarks 
 
 
Press 
Releases/Statements 
 
 
Total 
 
 
 
Clinton (D) 11 26 35 72 
Sanders (D) 25 50 109 184 
Cruz (R) 0 0 24 24 
Trump (R) 3 7 5 15 
Total frequency count 
for instances of climate 
change by source 
39 83 173 Sum of all 
Instances 
 
295 
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Figure 1. Frequency that Presidential Candidates Mentioned Climate Change  
     Source: Author’s Compilation  
 
Both Cruz and Trump do not mention climate change at the start or end of the period of 
investigation, whilst Sanders and Clinton are consistent in climate mentions. Climate 
communications increased as the primaries intensified. By temporally tracking the frequency of 
climate communications, one can see where the campaigns were most active in framing climate 
change. Out of the sixteen-month period, the most activity regarding the issue is between December 
2015 and May 2016.. As the primaries formally opened in February 2016, intense campaigning 
evidently took place in the build-up prior to this and was sustained for six months. Communications 
activity dropped when the primaries were effectively over. Cruz terminated his campaign in May 
whilst the investigation ended in June, which may have affected the average drop in frequency in the 
later stages. Given the low frequency count, it is more likely that this drop was due to less activity 
from the Sanders campaign rather than the Cruz campaign. Cruz and Trump are almost similar in 
their silence on the issue. This in itself speaks volumes. Both campaigns did not consider the climate 
change debate as an opportunity to win votes due to the low climate communications frequency. 
This is a reflection on the candidate’s own interests and priorities as well as an acknowledgment of 
the strategic implications in communicating the issue of climate change to specific stakeholders - 
Republican Party members. This agent-stakeholder duality is further explored in the next section.   
Clinton
25%
Sanders
62%
Cruz
8%
Trump
5%
Clinton Sanders Cruz Trump
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Figure 2 shows the breakdown of frames that the candidates used over the period. The national 
security interventionist frame was the most used by the Democrats, suggesting that both appealed 
to voter concerns of the risk of climate change. Whilst Sanders invoked scientific certainty as a close 
second, Clinton economically framed the issue to an almost equal weighting. This suggests that 
Sanders was intent on raising awareness to climate change whilst Clinton attempted to appeal to the 
economically concerned by framing climate mitigation as an opportunity to create renewable energy 
jobs. The economic frame is also the largest variance between the two Democrats, Clinton’s 30% to 
Sanders’ 11% reflects the difference between the two candidates’ priorities. Sanders was almost 
twice as likely to frame climate change as a moral issue than an economic issue, whilst the reverse 
can be said for Clinton. The implications of prioritising the use of one frame over another have 
consequences for stakeholder engagement.  
For the Republican candidates, no moral frame was identified, presumably because as Trump and 
Cruz rejected the climate science there was no moral obligation to address the issue. The Cruz 
campaign constructs its climate narrative that rejects the science as 71% of instances are framed 
with scientific uncertainty. Trump mostly communicated the issue as an economic burden by 
framing mitigation policies as barriers to industrial growth. Given the low count of climate mentions 
by the Republican candidates these frames are somewhat limited in confirming these assumptions. 
Although the scarcity of the data is revealing in how the candidates view climate polices as political 
capital, more data would have helped solidify these inferences.  
Figure 2: Climate Change Frames for Clinton, Sanders, Trump, and Cruz  
a. Upper left panel: Clinton                                                                                             
  
 b. Upper right panel: Sanders 
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c. Bottom left panel: Trump                                                                                     
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1Y Scientific 
Certainty
31%
2Y Economic 
Investment
11%
3Y - National 
Security 
Interventionist
37%
4Y - Morally 
Obligated
21%
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d. Bottom right panel: Cruz 
 
 
Source: Authors.When considering the total frames used by all candidates Figure 3 illustrates that 
the national security category is slightly leading as the frame most communicated.  
Figure 3: Frame Categories within Climate Change Discourse  
 
 
Source: Authors It is worthwhile to temporally track the different frames each candidate 
communicated over the period. A spike in a particular frame would be indicative of a contextual 
driver that necessitated a subsequent response in the framing of climate stances. Figure 4 shows the 
Science
31%
Economic
18%
National Security
33%
Moral 
18%
Science Economic
National Security Moral
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candidates’ frame progression over the period. For Clinton, both the economic and science frames 
have remained present throughout the period and climate communications on average increased in 
the last few months of 2015. Despite a dip in average at the start of 2016, the Clinton campaign 
increased its climate communications in the last period. These increased climate communications 
suggest the Clinton campaign adapted to several contextual drivers.  
Figure 4: Progression of Presidential Candidate Views on Climate Change for Clinton, Sanders, 
Trump, and Cruz  
                  a. Upper left panel: Clinton  
 
 
b. Upper right panel: Sanders 
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c. Bottom left panel: Trump 
            
d. Bottom right panel: Cruz 
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Source: Author’s Compilation  
The Sanders frame progression is less neat than Clinton’s. Emphasis must be placed on the 
frequency in which the frames are invoked, both start with low frequency counts for all frames but 
Sanders vastly out-communicates Clinton throughout the period where communications activity was 
most lively. As the primaries intensified, the Sanders campaign increased communications and 
reached a peak average of 20 and which, unlike Clinton, is sustained by a significant margin until 
April. In contrast to Clinton who experienced a rise in frame frequency in the final period, 
communications from the Sanders campaign drops off. This may be due to the final death throes of 
the Sanders campaign. However, it is emphasised that Clinton enjoys a whole month more than 
Sanders when assessing these values, somewhat skewing the comparison.2   
Due to the relative lack of data both Republican cases are limited in their analysis, but like the 
Democrats, there is increased communications activity at the height of the primaries. There are large 
spikes in the science frame for Cruz and the national security and economic frames for Trump. If the 
norm of communications is low, these anomalies warrant exploration for contextual drivers in order 
to uncover what forced the campaigns to communicate their climate stances. In a similar manner to 
the Democrats, the presumptive nominee increased communications at the end of the period whilst 
the loser‘s campaign dropped in activity.  
4.2 Global climate change negotiations as a landscape pressure    
The annual COPs are political media events with over 180 nations involved; making it important to 
recognise the convention’s significance in international relations and climate change mitigation 
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(Sosa-Nunez and Atkins, 2016). COP21 provided increased coverage on the issue of climate change 
and the climate communications present the opportunity to uncover how each campaign 
consequentially framed their climate positions.  
Sanders released four press releases over the period of the Paris Summit. The first two of these 
releases were the ‘proposal’ and ‘release’ of his ‘People before Polluters’ Climate Plan (no.65 & 
no.66). The timing is not coincidental, as more public attention was afforded to the issue of climate 
change through sustained media coverage, the Sanders campaign attempted to draw attention to its 
own climate plan. The title is revealing as the notion of ‘People before Polluters’ is grounded in 
morality (Čapek, 1993). As such, the Sanders campaign presents a dichotomy between 
environmental and public well-being on one side and the interests of fossil fuel companies on the 
other. Such views are communicated via press release:  
The United States must lead the world in working with China, Russia, India and the 
international community to break our energy dependence on fossil fuels…While fossil fuel 
companies are raking in record profits, climate change ravages our planet and our people – 
all because the wealthiest industry in the history of our planet has bribed politicians into 
ignoring science  (no.65) 
This climate narrative is constructed in national security, morality and science frames. Sanders’ 
populist Manichean discourse presents stakeholders an ultimatum of choosing a side. The 
interventionist and moral frames present a sense of urgency to the situation. This is supported by 
Sanders’ Press Release stating that the ‘Paris Accord Goes Nowhere Near Far Enough’ and critiques 
the COP21 as unable to provide ‘bold action’ (no.67). Sanders’ absolutist terms are appealing to 
many feeling disenfranchised from the political process and his anti-establishment rhetoric is 
particularly appealing to the young (Kawashima-Ginsberg et al., 2016). This appeal is understood by 
Sanders as the last press release around COP21 was a notification that he was to meet with students 
to discuss his ‘newly released plan to combat climate change’ (no.68).  
The Clinton campaign framed COP21 in a different manner to Sanders. A press release considered 
COP21 an ‘ambitious international climate agreement’ and ‘a historic step’ (no.10) the same day 
Sanders thought it too weak. Clinton framed COP21 (alongside her prior involvement as Secretary of 
State during Copenhagen’s COP15 summit) as evidence of leadership qualities in working towards 
multilateral agreements. Clinton therefore uses COP21 as a cornerstone of her green credentials and 
the summit is invoked a further 9 times throughout the investigated period. This is best seen in the 
Florida debate: ‘the Paris agreement was a huge step forward in the world, that Senator Sanders 
said was too weak, but I helped to lay the groundwork for that’ (no.17). Presenting the Paris talks as 
an international success and a significant accomplishment of the Obama administration, Clinton 
styles herself as a continuation of the Obama regime. Obama has an 86.7% approval rating amongst 
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Democrats (realclearpolitics.com, 2016) and so it is politically intuitive for Clinton to appear as his 
successor. The objective is an attempt to alienate Sanders from party insiders. 
The Republican candidates have an opposite narrative to that of the Democrats. In a press release 
titled ‘Sen. Cruz Confronts the Dogma of Climate Change Alarmism’, 7 in 8 frames were identified as 
scientific uncertainty. The Cruz campaign constructs the narrative by diagnosing the reality of the 
issue in the opposite manner to the Democrats, arriving to a different prescription, supported by 
studies findings in Fig. 5d. The other frame was an insinuation that the threat of international 
terrorism is more serious than climate change, an isolationist frame. COP21 was somewhat 
overshadowed by the Paris attacks and this is an example of the Cruz campaign appealing to the 
voter base by downplaying the risk of climate change and diverting attention to other national 
security concerns. A subsequent press release in April 22nd 2016 titled ‘Sen. Cruz Rebukes Paris 
Climate Agreement’ – where Cruz argues that the USA should focus on ‘real national security 
threats, rather than partisan dogma’ (no. 127).  
In his energy plan speech, Trump states that COP21 ‘gives foreign bureaucrats control over how 
much energy we use… We're going to cancel the Paris Climate Agreement and stop all payments of 
U.S. tax dollars to U.N. global warming programs’ (no.134). Trump sees such international treaties as 
undermining American sovereignty, the isolationist frame that fits the campaign’s nationalist 
rhetoric. He considers environmental regulation as a barrier to economic progress: ‘The 
Environmental Protection Agency's use of totalitarian tactics forces energy operators in North 
Dakota into paying unprecedented multi-billion dollar fines’ (no.134). Considering this speech was 
made in North Dakota, a state heavily dependent on the fossil fuel industry, it is politically intuitive 
that climate mitigation is framed via energy policy as a threat to stakeholder livelihood. Clearly, 
energy policy (and therefore proposed climate policy) are considerably influenced by stakeholder 
interests.  
The differences in communicated narratives of COP21 reveal much on the climate positions of all 
candidates. Sanders makes a case through the urgency of interventionist and moral frames whilst 
Clinton prefers to frame the issue in terms of achieving results by securing national interests. The 
Republicans paint the opposite picture as Cruz rejects the climate science and attempts to divert 
voter attention to other national security threats. Trump in a similar manner sees international 
climate mitigation as undermining American sovereignty and an impediment to domestic energy 
jobs. All candidates invoke the national security category meaning the political actors are aware that 
stakeholders respond to policy framed in security interests. Getting political actors talking through 
the same category is a first step in reconciliation.  
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4.3 The Flint Water Crisis and sensitivities to vulnerability  
The ongoing Flint Water Crisis has disproportionately affected socioeconomically disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods. Water was identified as a growing source of childhood lead exposure because of 
aging infrastructure (Hannah-Attisha et al., 2016). The crisis is not about climate change per se, but 
the imagery of the contamination of natural resources, and children as the victims, leads the 
electorate’s mind to environmental and resource policy making. An examination of the party 
debates in Michigan reveals how this imagery influences the discussion on climate change and how 
sensitive actors are in framing their positions within stakeholder contexts.  
Differences between the candidates’ stances on fracking and environmental management were 
contextualised in the Democratic Debate in Flint.   
Climate change has been a major talking point for both of you…Fracking can lead to 
environmental pollution including, but not limited to, the contamination of water supply. Do 
you support fracking? (no.16)  
Institutional-stakeholder dynamics are influential in how the candidates communicate their stances 
given specific stakeholder sensitivities. It is clear that such sensitivities have shaped the Democratic 
Party’s decision to uncover the candidate’s energy policies (implicitly revealing their climate 
stance).The consequences of appearing cavalier with the concerns of contaminated water (by 
association with support for fracking) could alienate potential votes. These dynamics shape 
candidates’ communications as they try to control and adapt their narrative to recognise these 
sensitivities. This is most evident for Clinton as she attempts to juggle her support for fracking whilst 
remaining conscious of this. The discourse reverts to the interventionist frame: ‘I worked with 
President Obama during the four years I was secretary of state to begin to put pressure on China and 
India and other countries to join with us to have a global agreement which we finally got in Paris’ 
(no.16). Clearly unwilling to expose her fracking stances to further critique, Clinton adapts and steers 
the debate to a more controlled line of communications by using the interventionist frame to project 
capability and awareness of national and local issues. 
Sanders is more absolutist in his positioning to Clinton: ‘my answer is a lot shorter [than Secretary 
Clinton’s]. No, I do not support fracking’ (no.96). Sanders then uses this as the springboard to 
communicate his climate change stance: ‘I’m glad you raised the issue of climate change, because 
the media doesn’t talk enough about what the scientists are telling us’ (no. 96) – a possible reason 
for the frequency in which Sanders communicates climate policy in comparison to other candidates. 
Sanders morally frames climate change by appealing to intergenerational justice – politically intuitive 
given the context that children were the victims of the Water Crisis. The moderator challenged 
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Sanders’ position on fracking by raising the fact that several Democratic governors supported such 
technologies, asked if they were wrong, a short ‘Yes.’ followed. Given stakeholder sensitivities, 
Sanders controls his communications by meeting challenging questions head on. His blunt ‘yes’ can 
be regarded as honest and by reiterating that fracking contaminates water supply, an emotional 
trigger in this arena, Sanders specifically attunes his climate and energy stances to stakeholder 
sensitives. The eco-populist narrative comes through with Sanders’ climate policy, he is able to 
contrast himself by painting Clinton as the establishment candidate with the establishment politics 
that have failed Flint.  
The Republican debate did not take place in Flint, but Detroit, and was moderated by Fox. Unlike the 
Democratic debate; there was no discussion or question on climate change in the 11th Republican 
debate. The Republican Party has influenced agent-stakeholder dynamics by not entertaining a 
discussion on climate change and neither Trump nor Cruz make direct mentions to climate change. 
Consequentially, stakeholder diagnostics of climate change remain unchallenged, exacerbating 
partisan polarisation and the climate logic schism. One can speculate the saliency that Trump places 
on climate change through his free-market position on regulation: ‘[The] Department of 
Environmental Protection. We are going to get rid of it in almost every form. We're going to have 
little tidbits left but we're going to take a tremendous amount out’. This is later reiterated in his 
energy plan:  
We’ll solve real environmental problems in our communities like the need for clean and safe 
drinking water. President Obama actually tried to cut the funding for our drinking water 
infrastructure -- even as he pushed to increase funding for his EPA bureaucrats (No. 134).  
The rejection of climate science is alluded to in ‘real environmental problems’. Much like Sanders, 
Trump also appeals to stakeholders by inferring to the Water Crisis and appropriating the blame at 
establishment and partisan politics.  
The Flint Water Crisis reveals how candidates attune their climate policies to stakeholder interests. 
The more rigorous debate is found between the two Democratic contenders whereas little can be 
said on the Republican side. Institutional-stakeholder dynamics are influential in revealing and 
shaping candidates’ climate communications, with the candidates subsequently framing climate 
stances by considering stakeholder interests in an attempt to control communications and adapt to 
contextual sensitivities. The role of institutions effects the deliberative quality on the issue of climate 
change. In this case, the Democrats entertain an open exchange of ideas in a democratic manner. On 
the other hand, the complete absence of the issue within Republican spheres only serves to 
exacerbate the existing logic schism. Reasons for the Republican’s lack of coverage may be due to 
the decision to reflect membership concerns (Gallup, 2016). Frequency is a form of control. Sanders 
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controls his narrative by frequently communicating in climate frames. Trump and Cruz were able to 
control their narrative by minimising climate communications. Such framings were assisted by 
institutional-stakeholder dynamics as these views were either encouraged or went unchallenged in 
the sanctioned debates.  
4.4 Clinton’s “Greenpeace Gaffe” and the contested politics of divestment  
In New York Clinton was questioned by a Greenpeace activist whether she would divest from fossil 
fuel campaign contributions. The response, caught on camera, showed a visibly angry Clinton 
accusing the Sanders campaign of lying about her despite the fact that there was no clear evidence 
that the activist was a Sanders supporter (Resnik-Day, 2016).  
Since the gaffe on March 31st, there were little meaningful mentions of climate change from the 
Clinton campaign. Two press releases appear: one to critique Chinese industrial activity and another 
to contrast herself with Republican stances - interventionist and scientific certainty frames 
respectively. This can be construed as damage control as to mention climate change could 
inadvertently bring up the political-economy of fossil fuel campaign donations. The omnipresent 
influence of institutional-stakeholder dynamics ensured the incident was mentioned in the Brooklyn 
debate. Like Flint, Clinton attempts to control the scrutiny over her fossil fuel links by diverting 
stakeholder attention through interventionist frames and critique Sanders. Note the somewhat 
realist tone:  
I want to do what we can do to actually make progress in dealing with the crisis… my 
approach I think is going to get us there faster without tying us up into political knots with a 
Congress that still would not support what you [Sanders] are proposing (no.22). 
The Sanders campaign was quick to adapt by releasing two press releases the day following the 
gaffe. The first communication states that: 
 If you include money given to super PACs backing Clinton, the fossil fuel industry has given 
more than $4.5 million in support of Clinton’s bid. Bernie believes it is critical that the next 
president acts to curb the worst effects of climate change by acting boldly to move our 
energy system away from fossil fuels. He also believes you cannot take on an industry if you 
take their money (no.102). 
 The only reference to climate change is communicated in an interventionist frame, but the crux of 
the response lies in questioning the integrity of Clinton’s climate pledges if the campaign takes 
money from vested interests. This is in direct contrast to the Sanders campaign which has explicitly 
rejected super PAC contributions as a cornerstone of the campaign (berniesanders.com, 2016). In 
the build-up to the debate four similar press releases make reference to Sanders’ climate policies, 
primarily framed in moral and scientific frames. Sanders continues his attacks on Clinton and 
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reiterates the call for a moratorium on fracking, New York being a state that did just that (no.107). 
Energy and climate are again seen as mutually reinforcing in politicising the issue.  
The Brooklyn debate saw Sanders repeat these attacks by highlighting the political economy of the 
Clinton campaign fundraising activities. This recurrence shows that, given the large stakeholder 
audience, debates represent the best opportunity to attack Clinton in comparison to the influence of 
press releases. Sanders boldly appeals to the democratic base by stylising himself under FDR:  
If we approach this… as if we were literally at a war — you know, in 1941, under Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt, we moved within three years to rebuild our economy to defeat Nazism and 
Japanese imperialism. That is exactly the kind of approach we need right now (no.109).  
The second democratic debate supports this and shows Sanders’ consistency on the issue. When 
asked if climate change represented the greatest threat to national security in light of the November 
Paris Attacks, Sanders doubled down and replied ‘absolutely’ (no.62). Sanders uses the Greenpeace 
Gaffe as the political opportunity to criticise Clinton’s energy positions and legitimise his own by 
framing climate change existential threat to stakeholders. Climate stances underpin the wider 
consequences for energy policy here. Given the relatively low interest in climate change as an issue, 
Sanders frames the gravity of the situation in a way that most Americans are sensitive to– security 
issues (Gallup, 2016). There are differences in how the Democrats communicate the interventionist 
frame. Sanders considers climate change as ‘the single greatest threat facing our planet’ 
(berniesanders.com, 2016) whilst Clinton regards it as ‘an urgent threat and a defining challenge of 
our time’ (HillaryClinton.com, 2016). At the prompting of the Democratic Party, such discourse 
reveals to stakeholders who would be the more aggressive in implementing climate change 
legislation. The interventionist frame is most frequently invoked by both Democrats and the security 
category is the most communicated in the study. As the security category is again the product of 
morphogenetic cycles, a space for solution making could be fostered here. Arguably, a limit to this 
investigation does not reveal the diverging position within the security category or interventionist 
frame, suggesting further research need take place.   
Clinton’s Greenpeace gaffe served as a catalyst for increased frequency in climate mentions. Again, 
frequency is a form of communications control: Clinton’s communication activity was relatively low, 
presumably in an attempt of damage control; whilst the Sanders campaign took advantage of the 
opportunity to simultaneously critique Clinton and present himself as the candidate serious about 
addressing climate change. The relationship between stakeholders, political actors and institutions 
explicitly reveals that security is a safer bet when framing climate change, at least in terms of 
resonating with voters.  
   25 
5: Conclusion and Implications  
In this study, we comprehensively coded and analysed statements from the U.S. Presidential 
Primaries to determine the frequency and content of material regarding climate change, with 
attention paid to the interaction with stated energy policies and the evolving morphology of energy 
frames. A total of 561 sources comprising of debates, campaign speeches and press releases were 
initially gathered over the 2016 presidential primaries. The final dataset was narrowed down to 134 
sources that included one or more instance of climate change. The results indicate Sanders vastly 
“out-communicated” the issue than his opponents whilst very little climate communications were of 
Republican origin. The extent to which candidates regarded the issue of climate change as a source 
of political revenue is denoted by the frequency in which these worldviews are raised. Framing 
constructs and organises these worldviews in order to engage stakeholders. Three contextual 
drivers: COP21, the Flint Water Crisis and Clinton’s Greenpeace Gaffe served to illustrate how these 
frames were employed as a discursive strategy to appeal to stakeholders.  
Frequency, control and institutional factors are mutually influencing in how different climate stances 
are formed. Frequency not only denotes the confidence candidates regard their climate stances as a 
“vote winner”, but is also a form of controlling the campaigns direction and narrative. The 
Republicans used their lack of communications as a form of control, whilst the Democrats increased 
communications to assert it.  
We find that institutional-stakeholder-agency relations capture the dynamic processes of how 
climate and energy discourse is brought to light. The sanctioned Democratic debates have 
demonstrated how stakeholder sensitivities and positions on energy can influence candidates to 
adapt their campaign communications for fear of voter repercussion. The Republican debates were 
notable for the lack of climate questions, providing little scrutiny of the candidates’ climate 
positions. In this context climate policy is seemingly developed on the basis of what wins votes. 
Furthermore, politicians are not being significantly held accountable for these stances within 
important electoral processes. This is especially true for the Republican Party as the lack of climate 
discourse re-enforces voters’ pre-existing climate change realities as they remain unchallenged by 
alternative framings. The problem is frustrating circular. 
Hoffman’s (2011) framing analysis provides the basis in which to resolve this stalemate by activating 
‘broker categories’. The scientific category, where the debate is most contentious, determines the 
diagnostics of climate realities and leads to polarised remedies that should be avoided where 
possible. The study’s results show that the national security category was the most communicated 
climate stance. Security issues poll as a high concern amongst the electorate so it is logical for 
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climate communications to be framed in such a way to reach multiple stakeholder groups. The 
contextual drivers serve to illustrate how morphogenetic cycles produce this category as a means of 
influencing stakeholder awareness. Raising such awareness increases the deliberative quality on 
climate change, offering to make in-roads in achieving cross-party progress through consensus 
orientated politics. A distinct lack of deliberative quality only serves to exacerbate the logic schisms 
surrounding climate mitigation policies. This study proposes that the securitization of climate change 
provide a space where solutions may crystalize. However, this study is limited as further 
investigation is required in what common ground can be found within this category.  Moreover, 
utilizing a security frame, or securitizing energy and climate discourses, do not come without risks.  
Oels (2012) warns that making climate a security issue can promote elitism and close it off from local 
populations; Kester et al. (2017) note that invoking a security logic can even be dangerous lead to 
hasty and unintended consequences.   
The broader implications are clear: institutional-stakeholder influences are serious – some narratives 
need to be challenged (or merely present) in order to hold those running for office to account. 
Climate discourse needs to engage both sides of the aisle whilst avoiding divisive frames. A key 
challenge is to frame climate change under national security terms (particularly in Republican 
spheres) to influence morphogenetic processes and bring about meaningful climate dialogue and 
policy. The discourse constructing the securitization of climate change must be deliberative in order 
to promote consensus driven politics. Raising public awareness through climate discourse will bring 
more stakeholders into the discussion and overcome the logic schisms that render climate mitigation 
in policy limbo.      
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